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COLLATERAL ATTACK UPON JUDGMENTS ON THE
GROUND OF FRAUD.
While it is not the purpose of this article to consider or
discuss the fundamental bases of the law, the inquiry here being
directed to a rather narrow and superficial question, it is nevertheless interesting to trace the development of fundamentals,
through their application to ever increasingly complicated states
of fact, into fine spun distinctions. The wit and humor of
bench and bar often lend a key which unlocks the door of
mystery. It is sometimes said that courts are places -where
justice is.dispensed with. The jest derives its poignancy from
the fact that the universality of the law does not always work
justice between individual litigants.
Nevertheless, behind the doctrines of the common law are
the fundamental principles of justice. Where two or more
great underlying rules of justice may be applied to a state of
facts in such way as to produce contrary results, fine spun distinctions arise. Such hair splittings we are here to consider.
It may be well to begin by examining the causes out of which
they arise.
It is one of the fundamental principles of justice that questions once litigated should be forever at rest. Stare decisis.
The principle commonly spoken of as "res adjudicata" is but
an outgrowth of this underlying rule. "Interest republicae ut
(103)
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sit finis litem." On the other hand it is no less fundamental
that no man should be allowed to take advantage of his own
fraud. But no sooner are these two principles brought into
juxtaposition than trouble begins. Suppose a man secures an
adjudication by fraud. Which principle is to govern,? Shall the
resolution of the law be that the judgment must stand because
it is a thing adjudicated or must the very decision be declared
void, because tainted with fraud? If the first conclusion is
reached, a man may take advantage of his own fraud. If the
second, the principle of res adjudicatamust admit of exceptions.
These considerations make it natural that we should find
not only loose language in ill considered cases, but also erroneous applications of the principles properly applicable to the
facts. It at once becomes essential that we should define our
subject with greatest care, for it is because of not keeping the
definition in mind, that decisions have been erroneous.
It must needs be noticed that to permit a direct attack upon
a judgment in no way affects-the principle of res adjudicata,
for the judgment is not, properly speaking, final until every
direct mode of obtaining a different result has been exhausted.
The decision of any court which has assumed the form of
a final judgment may be attacked in two ways. It is possible
by steps taken in the very proceeding to set it aside by motion
for a new trial, appeal, or writ of error, or by motion to open
or to strike off the judgment. It is possible to plead or prove
the invalidity of the judgment in question, when its bar or its
enforcement are material in some other proceeding. We are
here concerned with collateral attack. The term is defined in
Morrill v. Morrill 1 as follows: "A collateral attack-on a judgment is any proceeding which is not instituted for- the express
purpose of annulling, correcting or modifying such decree." 2
Ore. 96 (89o).
'For example, in Morris v. Travellers Insurance Company, 189 Fed. -ir
(9xi), A, by his father and next friend, brought suit against B, and a settlement was affected and a judgment for A entered and satisfied. Then A sued
the liability insurance company, alleging fraud in the prior judgment. Held,
this was a collateral attack. In Rheno v. Emery, 65 Fed. 826 (Ohio x8g5),
one of several heirs sought to hold the others for fraud in having the lands
'20
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Such an attack upon a judgment is a 'collateral attack for
the cogent reason that it is not a direct attack. When"we realize
the simple force of the definition, we are amazed to find solemn
decisions, so wholly oblivious to common sense, are unworthy
on a judgment on the ground of fraud is a direct attack. s Such
decisions, so wholly oblivious of common sense, are unworthy
of more than passing notice. Whether an attack on a judgment
is direct or collateral depends solely upon whether the proceedings in which the attack is made is solely for the purpose of
attacking the judgment questioned. The reason for the attack
can, in the nature of things, have nothing to do with it. It is
obvious that such decisions are rendered because the rules of
law applicable to the facts seemed to be in conflict with the justice of the particular case and the judges are led, by a desire
to see justice done between the parties, into an absurdity. A collateral attack upon a judgment can be made -either
at law or in equity l)ut the definition we have given to the
phrase makes it clear that equitable relief against a judgment
should not be confused with a collateral attack upon it. Moreover, equitable relief is not direct attack, for in the former case
it is because the validity of the judgment is recognized that
relief is granted, whereas the purpose of the latter is a declaration of the nullity of the judgment.4
of the estate sold under a decree of court. Held, this was a collateral
attack upon the decree of sale.
aCorwin v. Toole, 31 Iowa 513 (i87); Whetstone v. Whetstone, 3x
Iowa 276 (1871); Kirby v. Kirby, x42 Ind. 419 (1895); Collerell v. Koon,
xz Ind. 182 (i9S8), and in Saunders v. Brice, 56 S. C. i (if8), it was
said that an attack on a judgment on the ground that the attorney had no
authority was not a collateral attack.
'The following cases are frequently cited as cases of collateral attack
and must, therefore, be mentioned here. Every one of them is a case of
equitable relief, every one recognizes the judgment against which relief is
sought. Robinson v. Davis, ii N. J. Eq. 3o2 (1897); Boston v. Sparhawk,
i Allen 448 (Mass. 15I) ; Clover v. Flowers, io N. C. 134 (1888) ; Thomas
v. Ireland, 88 Ky. 58t (1889); Baker v. Byrn, 89 Hun ii$ (N. Y. 1895);
Wilson v. Williams, 115 Ga. 472 (1902); Burkarth v. Stephens, 117 Mo.
App. 425 (19o5); Houser v. Bonnell, 149 N. C. 52 (igo8); Haldeman v.
Dougherty, 17o Ala. 362 (19x); French v. Thomas, 252 Ill. 65 (1g91); De
Soto v. Hill. 65 Sou. 988 (Ala: 1914); Laun v. Kipp, 155 Wis. 347 (1914);but see Smith v. Smith, 22 Iowa s16 (i8ft); Langdon v. Blackburn, iog
Cal. 19 (1895); Gilman v. Heitman, 137 Iowa 336 (igS).
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There are two grounds which customarily are assigned for
a collateral attack upon a judgment: fraud and want of jurisdiction. The latter usually involves the 'former but the two
are clearly distinguishable. The question of jurisdiction can
always be raised. No judgment can be binding if the court
which rendered it was without jurisdiction. It it, therefore,
necessary to distinguish carefully the cases in which thq real
ground of the attack is lack of jurisdiction. 5
Having thus limited our inquiry, we must be on our guard
lest the loose expressions to be found in some cases mislead us.
Thus, for example, there are cases in which the expression
"collateral attack" is used though the proceeding was scire
facias to revive the judgment attacked. In those states where
the procedure to revive a judgment is scire facias, it is difficult
to understand how such an attack can be called collateral. But
an attack on a judgment in a proceeding to revive it, is not,
correctly speaking, a collateral attack.0
ATTACK BY A PARTY OR A PRIVY.

A judgment may -be attacked by a party to it, or by one
standing in pi ivity to a party, or, it may be attacked by a total
stranger to the record. For the sake of convenience we shall
consider first collateral attack by a party or privy.
'Where fraud gocs'to the jurisdiction the judgment is void, even though
regular on its face, Lucy v. Deas, 59 Fla. 552 (rgo); Mahoney v. Insurance
Company, 133 Iowa 570 (19o7.). 'The only fraud that can be relied upon
to avoid a judgment in a collateral attack is fraud which inheres in the
judgment and which affects the jurisdiction," Weedman v. Fowler, 84 Kan.
75 (19ii). The diclum in Ziemer v. Steel Co., 99 N. Y. App. 169 (i904),
which appears wholly irreconcilable with the New York cases, is clearly in
line when it is considered that the fraud set up removed the jurisdiction
of the court. See also Young v. Wiley, i07 N. E. 278 (Ind. 1914); Granger.
v. Clark, 22 Me. 128 (842); White v. Bedell, j73 S. NV. 624 (Tex. 1915),
where the attack was allowed; Burton v. Perry, 146 Ill.
71 0893), where
it was said that fraud which affects the jurisdiction can be shown, and Cody
v. Cody, 98 Wis. 445 (1898). where it was said that unless the fraud goes
to the jurisdiction it cannot be shown.
'In House v. Collins, 42 Tex. 486 (1875), was a sci. fa. to revive, it was
held the original iudgment could be questioned for fraud. On the other
hand, in Bruno v. Oviatt, 48 La. Ann. 471 (x896); Carpentier v. Oakland,
3o Cal. 439 (1866), and Granger v. Clark, 22 Me. 128 (1842), where these
cases were suits on judgments, it was held that such a defense could not
be raised. Sherbourne v. Shepard, 142 Mass. 141 (886), decides that fraud
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There are many decisions stating the broad general rule
that it is not permissible for a party or privy to attack a judgment in a collateral proceeding on account of fraud.7
An attack for fraud may be based upon matter which appears on the face of the record, or, for matter dhorns the record.
It may be well, therefore, to observe, at this point, that the
general principle is open to a very broad exception, namely, that
if it appears on the face of the record that a judgment was
obtained by fraud, it may be impeached in a collateral proceeding. But this is really not an exception to the general rule;
for a judgment which shows on its face that it was obtained by
fraud is absolutely void.8 It is, therefore, not a judgment,
though bearing the form of one, and so to impeach it collaterally, is not, strictly speaking, a collateral attack upon a judgment. To permit impeachment under such circumstances is
perfectly consistent with the general rule."
If, on the other hand, the fraud does not appear on the
face of the record, the general rule applies.
This general rule should be carefully stated, for it is the
basis of our thesis. It has often been expressed ihus: "It is
a general rule at common law that a judgment of a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties cannot be
in the taxation of costs is no defense to a sci. fa. to revive, while Paxton v.
Cobb, 2 La. 137 (1831), holds that fraud in obtaining the judgment may be
set up as a defense to an execution, but see Harshman v. Knox Co., x2
U. S. 3o6 (1887), and Toomey v. Rosansky, ii Pa. Superior Ct. 5o6 (8g9).
"Logan v. Central Iron Company, 139 Ala. 548 (i9o3); Bush v. Sheldon,

i Day 17o (Conn. 18o3); Telford v. Barney, i Greene 575 (Iowa 1848);
Hickey v. Duplantier, 4 La. 3-14 (1832); Clark v. Colton, 91 Md. 195 (goo);
Taylor v. State, 73 Md. 208 (ixgo) ; Ellis's Estate, 55 Minn. 401 (1893) ; State
v. Ross, 118 Mo. 23 (1893); Cooper v. Duncan, 58 Mo. App. 5 (1894);
Krekler v. Ritter, 62 #N. Y. 372 (7875); Rice v. Bruff, 87 Hun 511 (N. Y.
z89s); People v. Downing, 4 Sandf. i89 (N. Y. x85o); Bank v. Kern, 8
Dist. 75 (Pa. 1899); Mikeska v. Blum, 63 Tex. 44 (i885); Murchison v.
White, s4 Tex. 78 (i88o); Rankin v. Hooks, 81 S. W. ioo5 (Tex. x9o4);
Kruegel v. Stewart. 81 S. W. 65 (Tex. 79o4) ; Scudder v. Cox, 35 Tex. Civ.
App. 416 (7904); Giddings v. Steele, 28 Tex. 732 (1866); Turner v. Stewart,
5I W. Va. 493 (i9o2); Kent v. Lake Superior, 144 U. S.75 (i89r); King
v. Davis, 137 Fed. 198 (.Va. i9o3).
'Mahoney v. Insurance Company, 133 Iowa 57o (0o7) ; Friebe v. Elder,
187 Ind. 597 (1913).
"Granger v. Clark, 22 Me. 128 (1842); Carpentier v. Oakland, 30 CaL"
439 0866); Hart v. Hunter, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 75 (igoS). The cases of
judgments void on the face of the record are necessarily few.
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questioned collaterally for fraud aliunde the record, by parties
or their privies. After a party has been duly served with process.
it is his duty to see that the judgment is not fraudulently obtained against him and if it is he must take some proper proceedings to have it annulled."' 10 As has been frequently pointed
out, the basis of this rule is that the good order and peace of
society require that there should be an end to litigation.
The rule thus stated, however, is to be strictly construed.
The court must have jurisdiction of the rcs and of the person.
The record must be regular on its face. The person seeking to
impeach the judgment must be a party to the suit in which it
was rendered or privy to such party.
It was in the consideration of this strict application of the
rule that the court said in Mason v. Mcssinger 1 ' "No case ever
went so far as to say a judgment could be collaterally attacked
for fraud.". But even so, the statement is by no means accurate.
There are many decisions permitting such attack. The first
question, then, is, can these decisiois be reconciled and if so
upon what theory, and if not, can we segregate the irreconcilable
cases so as to pronounce the rule in some jurisdictions to be
different from that in others. We must be very careful that
the cases which seem to decide that a judgment may be col"Homer v. Fish, i Pick. 435 (Mass. 1823); Callaghan v. Griswold, 9
Mo. 784 (18416) ; White v. Merrit, 7 N. Y. 352 (1852); Kelley v. Mize, 3
Sneed 59 (Tenn. 1855); Hatch v. de la Garza, 22 Tex. 176 (1858); Mason v.
Messinger, 17 Iowa 261 (1864); Smith v. Smith, 22 Iowa S16 (1867); The
Acorn, 2 Abbott U. S. 434-1. Fed. Cas. No. -9 (1870); Davis v. Davis, 61
Me. 395 (873) ; New York Central v. Harold, 65 How. Prac. 89 (N. Y.
1883); Bryant v. Estabrooke, i6 Neb. 217 (1884); Hodgson v. Southern
Pacific, 75 Cal. 642 (888); Mannix v. State, Iis Ind. 245 (1888); Gainor v.
Johnson, 15 S. V. 246 (Ky. i8gi) ; Carter v. Roundtree, iog N. C. 29 (189I) ;
Storer v. Lane, i Tex. Civ. App. 250 0892); Schultz v. Schultz, 136 Ind.
323 (1893); Bowman v. Wilson, 64 I1. App. 73 0895); Kansas City Railway v. Morgan, 76 Fed. 429 (1896); Board of Commissioners v. Platt, 79
Fed. 567 (1897); McCambridge v' Walvern, 88 Md. 378 (1898); Irwin v.
Bexar County, 63 S. W. 55o (Tex. igoi); People v. Fogg, 132 Cal. 289
(i9ox); Johnson v. Stebbins, 167 Mo. 325 (9o2) ; Oster v. Broe, 161 Ind;
Earp v. Minton, '38 N. C. 2o2 09o5); Morris v. Sadler, 74

113 (1903);

Kan. 892 (igo6); Davis v. Muir, 15i Cal. 318 (9o7); Nelson v. Felsing,
2o (I9o9); Hall v. Hall, 139 N. Y. App. 12o (91o); Young
v. Wiley, io7 N. H. 278 (Id. I914) ; :Osborun v. Moss, 7 Johns. i6.(N. Y.
IO), goes so far as to say parties and privies cannot collaterally attack
at all, and so does Stewart v. Stisher, 83 Ga. 297 (i889).

32 D. C. App.

I7

Iowa 261 (1864).
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laterally impeached for fraud really so hold for "there are to
be found in the books certain cases in which the courts have
used language, sometimes pertinent to the question before them
for adjudication and at other times mere dicta holding that
judgments can be collaterally attacked for fraud."1 2 It has
been said, indeed, "It is believed that nearly every case will
be found exceptional in character, such as fraud apparent on
the face of the record, a judgment by confession or a feigned
issue or the language used mere dicta."1 3 An examination of
the authorities will show -whether or not this statement is supported.
Domestic Judgments.
It has been said that the test of permissibility of a collateral attack is to be found in the requirement that "the fraud
must have been practiced in the very act of obtaining the judg14
ment," but though this theory is supported by some cases it
is not helpful. It lends no essential criterion. The question,
what is the "very act of obtaining judgment," is susceptible of
innumerable answers.
"That fraud vitiates everything, including the judgments
and decrees of courts, and that judgments rendered by courts
not having jurisdiction are null, are expressions running through
all the books it is true." 15 Justice Sanderson, however, explains
the proper use of the terms, he thus employs, by saying: "The
expressions, however, are but the expressions of abstract truths,
and are to be understood in a qualified sense. They mean
"Mason v. Messinger. 17 Iowa 261 (864).
3"Ibid.
"Hardeman v. Donaghey, 17o Ala. 362 (gii); De Soto v. Hill, 65 Sou.
988 (Tex. 19T4); Weedman v. Fowler, 84 Kan. 75 (i9) ; Justice v. Georgia Realty Company, xog Va. 366 (igog); Porter v. Roundtree, iii Ga. 369
(igoo); Rice v. Bruff, 87 Hun 511 (N. Y. 1895).
" See Amador v. Mitchell, 59 Cal. 168 (1881), at p. 178; Hallach v. Loft,
i9 Colo. 74 (Y893); Cotterell v. Koon, IS! Ind. 182 (i8g8); Oster v. Broe,
161 Ind. 113 (19o3); Warthen v. Himstreet, 112 Iowa 6o5 (igoo); U. S. v.
Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61 (1878). In Mandeville v. Reynolds, 68 N. Y.
528 (1877), which was a suit upon a domestic judgment, the defendant was
allowed to show that the judgment had been satisfied, whereupon plaintiff
was permitted to show that the attorneys who entered satisfaction had no
authority to do so.
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nothing more than that such is the case when fraud and want
of jurisdiction has been made
to appear in the proper mode
le
and by competent evidence."
What, then, is the proper mode? We :can get at this question by the process of elimination. To allege that the judgment
in question was obtained by perjured evidence will not suffice, 17
nor will the allegation that the instrument sued upon was obtained by fraud,"' nor that the judgment was erroneous.in law.1 9
Therefore, one who could have'appealed cannot attack collaterally.2. 0 Actual fraud, not in the consideration, and other than
perjury, must be the foundation of the attack. But "it is not
every act of bad faith, duplicity or even untruth in procuring
a judgment that constitutes such fraud as will authorize a court
in a collateral proceeding to hold a judgment fraudulent and
void.""1
Though it has been said that collateral attacks have been
allowed since the time of Lord Coke, 2 probably the earliest
adjudication of an attack by a party, and the leading case, is
Moses v. Macferlan.2' That was a suit by a defendant in the
Court of Conscience against the plaintiff therein, because the
plaintiff had recovered and collected a judgment on promissory
notes endorsed by the defendant to the plaintiff, despite a cove"In Carpentier v. Oakland, 3o Cal. 439 (1866).
"Dunlap v. Glidden, 31 Me. 435 (i85o); Greene v. Greene, 2 Gray 36i
(Mass. 1854); Dilling v. Murray, 6 Ind. 324 (.j855); Carr v. Miner, 42 IlL
179 (1866); U. S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 6x (x878); Burton v. Perry,
146 Ill. 71 (1893); Rexiord v. Brunswick, 1x8 Fed. 462 (N. C. 1910); Pattison v. Smith, 94 Ark. 588 (i9io); Crouse v. McVicker, 207 N. Y. 2r3
(1912).

'Bush v. Sheldon, x Day i7o (Conn. i803); McClees v. Burt, 5 Met. x98
(Mass. 1842).
"'Carr v. Miner, 42 Ill. 179 (1866); U. S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61
(1878); Bonner v. Gorman, 7i Ark. 480 (9o3); Young v. Wiley, io7 N. F.
278 (Ind. 1914).

'Granger v. Clark, 22 Me. 128 (1842); Smith v. Abbott, 40 Me. 442
(1855); Davis v. Davis, 61 Me. 395 (1873); Bryant v. Estabrooke, 16 Neb.
217 (1884); Weiss v. Guerneau, zog Ind. 438 (1886); Cody v. Cody, 98 Wis.
445 (i89S); Morris v. Sadler, 74 Kan. 892 (19o6); Weedman v. Fowler, 84
Kan. 75 (igHx); Crouse v. McVicker, 20q7 N. Y. 2r3 (192).
Obiter, in Carr v. Miner, 42 11. 179 (t866).
= See Fermor's Case, 3 Reports, 77a.
X2 Burrows ioo5 (i76o).
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nant not to sue. Lord Mansfield said:24 "It is most clear that.
the merits of a judgment can never be overhaled by an original
suit either at law or in equity. Till the judgment is set aside
or reversed it is conclusive as to the subject matter of it, to alt
intents and purposes."
These sentences epitomize the best opinion upon the point..
The other cases only elucidate the thoughtm whick prompted:
Lord Mansfield's words.
25
The earliest American case seems to be Homer v. Fish.
In that case, the defendant caused the plaintiff to insure his
vessel upon which there was a loss. He sued the plaintiff, and,
on the execution, collected the amount of the loss. Then the
plaintiff brought an action. against the defendant to. recover the
money so collected upon the ground that the defendant knew
there had been a loss when he insured, but concealed the knowledge from the plaintiff and the fraud was not discovered untilafter the execution was satisfied. It was- held that the. former
judgment was a bar to. the action.
Davis v. Davis 20 was an action of dower based on a decree
of diyorce. The defendant offered to prove his collusion in
obtaining the decree.; This was objected to and the objection
was sustained. The Supreme Court, on appeal, affirmed this
judgment
The case of United States v. Throckunorton.2 7 is particularly well considered and wofthy of the most careful thought.
One Richardson filed a claim for land in California under a
Mexican grant. Finding that he had no evidence to sustain the
grant he went to Mexico and, persuaded MicheltorenaL former
Mexican governor of California, to sign and antedate a false
document of, title and procured the perjured testimony of two
witnesses before a commissioner. Richardson then returned and
secured a patent for his land. Mr. justice Miller delivered the
opinion of the court. He said in part:
"At page ioo8.
"i Pick. 435 (Mass. 1823).
" 6 1 Me. 395 (1873).

98 U. S. 61 (1878).
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"There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates
the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments. There
is also no question that many rights originally founded in fraud
become . . . no longer open to inquiry in the usual and ordinary methods. . . . If the court has been mistaken in the law
there is a remedy by writ of error. If the jury has been mistaken
in the facts the remedy is by motion for new trial. If there has
been evidence discovered since the trial, a motion for a new trial
will give the appropriate relief. But all these are parts of the same
proceeding, relief is given in the same suit and the party is not
vexed by another suit for the same matter. So in a suit in chancery, on proper showing, a rehearing is granted. If the injury
complained of is an erroneous decision, an appeal to a higher court
gives opportunity to correct the error. If new evidence is discovered after the decree has become final, a bill of review on that
ground may be filed. Here again these proceedings are all part of
the same suit and the rule framed for the repose of society is not
violated.
"But there is an admitted exception to this general rule in
cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party
to the suit, there was, in fact, no adversary trial or decision of the
issue in the case. Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his case by fraud or deception practised on
him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false
promise of a compromise or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff,
or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes
to represent a party 28 and connives at his defeat; or where the
attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his interests to
the other side-these and similar cases, which show that there has
never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case, are
reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and
annul the former judgment or decree and open the case for a new
and fair hearing. . . . In all these cases and many others
which have been examined relief has been granted on the ground
that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking
relief against the judgment or decree, that party has been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court.
"On the other hand, the doctrine is equally well settled that
the court will not set aside a judgment because it was founded on
a fraudulent instrument or perjured evidence or for any matter
which was actually presented and considered in the judgment
assailed. . .
"There is an old case in South Carolina to the effect that

'This has been doubted, Hageman v. Salisbery, 74 Pa. 280 (1873).
But see Saunders v. Brice, 56 S C.C1 (1899), and Mandeville v. Reynolds, 68
N. Y.

528

(1877).
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fraud in obtaining a bill of sale would justify equitable interference
as to the judgment obtained thereon. But I judge it stands almost
or quite alone and has no weight as a precedent." 29
Edgerton v. Edgerton 30 is an unusually well considered
case. A sued his wife for divorce and obtained a decree. Then
she sued him in another court of the same state for support and
offered to show, in rebuttal of the decree, facts aliunde the
record whereby to impeach it for fraud. The evidence was
excluded and it was held that this was not error. Harwood, J,
said:
"While there is much conflict relating to certain questions of
law .concerning judgments, we think it may be safely said- to be
almost universally settled now, that domestic judgments of courts
of general jurisdiction, valid on their face, cannot be collaterally
attacked in courts of the same state, by showing facts aliunde the
record although such facts might be sufficient to impeach the judgment if brought to bear upon it in a proper proceeding."
In Bowman v. Wilson s 1 B gave A a judgment note, which
A entered up in Cook County, Illinois. C then brought partition for certain lands held in common by B, C, and several
others in Greene County of the same State. A obtained leave
to intervene to collect his judgment. B offered to show that
the Cook County judgment had been obtained by fraud but the
court ruled out the offer. Pleasants, J., said:
"It is truly said, generally, that fraud vitiates everything, judg-"
ments included, into which it effectively enters. But this is said
only of fraud properly alleged and duly shown in a proper proceeding. A court of law may set aside its own judgments obtained by
fraud upon itself, but not for fraud practiced only upon the adverse
party, when hehas had his day in court, or his opportunity, to have
it or has waivcd it, and his adversary has obtained judgment on
competent evidence however false and fraudulent."
It would seem, then, from a consideration of these leading
cases and the host of precedents which follow them 82 that the
law is clearly established that a judgment of a court having
The case referred to is Crawford v. Crawford, 4 De Sau. 176 (S. C.
12 Mont. 122 (1892).
64 IIl. App. 73 (1895).
nSupra, see notes 7 and io.
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jurisdiction over the subject matter and' the parties cannot be
questioned collaterally for fraud by evidence of facts aliunde
the record by the parties or their privies.
But to this rule there seem to be several clear exceptions
founded upon reason as well as upon authority. The rule being
based upon the reasoning in Moses v. Macferlan ". to the effect
that the merits of contested cases may never again be "overhaled," it is but consistent to predicate (as was indicated in the
dicta in United States v. Th.rocknorton) 4 that where the fraud
resides in a matter which has not been adjudicated by the judgment put in issue, it may be made the basis of a collateral
attack.
The exception is a recent development. The earliest case
wherein the distinction is dravn is Daniels v. Benedict 35 decided in 1892 by the United States Circuit Court in Colorado.
The plaintiff, a widow, brought a suit for partition, alleging
that she and her deceased husband had agreed that he should
secure a divorce on the ground of desertion, but that he had
sued on the ground'of'adultery, a fact that she had not learned
until after the decree had been entered. It was held that the
plaintiff had a cause of action, for the fraud was extrinsic to
the matters contained in the record and by reason of it the
parties were not in pari dclicto.30 Whatever may be said of
that
the exception thus stated, it is fairly clear of
it. the case before
application
the court was not one for the
In Ward v. Southfield - the defendant did not disclose his
case and obtained judgment. Vhen the plaintiff found out that
he had been duped, he moved to set aside the judgment. While
this was not a collateral attack, Earl, J., treated it as if it were
and said: 3 8
Burrows Ioo5-ioo8 (76o).
"98 U. S. 61 (878).
"2

"S5o Fed. 347.' The decision was probably based on the diclum in U. S.
v. Throckmorton, supra.
" See Davis v. Davis, 6x Me. 395 (1873), where the libellant was not
allowed to plead her own collusion in a divorce case to avoid the effect of
the decree.
"io2 N. Y. 287.
io2 N. Y. 29z.
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"But where the fraud is not the subject of litigation, not any
thing which was in the issues tried, but fraud practiced upon a
party or the court during the trial or in prosecuting the action,
or in obtaining the judgment it may be attacked collaterally and"
on account thereof set aside and vacated. But before a regular
judgment can be assailed, the proof should be clear and very satisfactory."
It was not until the case of Justice v. GeorgiaReaity corn.

pany

that the exception under consid at'i

in language pertinent to the point of law at issue. Justice owned
an island in the James River opposite'Richmond whi6ithI Trigg
Shipbuilding-Company wanted to buy, but Justice refused to sell.
The Shipbuilding Company and the City of Richmond agreed
that the latter should take. the island by eminent domain and
then exchange it to the Shipbuilding Company for other lands
owned by the latter. This was done, and after Justice's death
his widow brought a bill in equity to set aside' the decree of
condemnation on the ground of fraud, and to assign her dower.
The widow had not been a 'party' to the proceedsiig attacked,
but there undoubtedly was privity.' ° The case is clearly one
of collateral attack, for the purpose of this bill was the assignment of dower; the setting aside the decree of condemnation
was incidental. Whittle, J., thus states the exception:
"The rule with regard to the distinction between cases in which
judgments may and those in which they may not be impeached
collaterally for fraud is stated thus: They may be impeached by
facts involving fraud or collusion but which were not before the
court or involved in the issue or matter upon which the judgment
was rendered. They may not be impeached for any facts whether
involving fraud. or collusion or not or even perjury which were
necessarily before the court and passed upon."' 1
129 Va. 366 (i90).
"'The
'court
relied on Mahoney v. Insurance Comp'aniy, 133 Iowa 570
(1907), but neithei- that case nor Jackson v. Wilkerson, i6o Fed. 623 (1908),
is a clear disquisition on the exception under consideration.
'There are several cases in which the converse of this proposition has
been stated, Hatch v. de la Gaiza, 22 Tex. '76 (1858); Finley v. Houser, 22
Ore. 562 (1892) ; Turney v'. Van Gelder; 18 X. Y. Supp. 547 (i892); Trogdon
v. Cleveland Stone Company, 53 111. App. 206 (1893); Nevitt v. First National Bank, 91 Hun 43 (N. Y i895), and .several dicta, such as that in
Crouse v. McVicker, 207 N. Y. 213 (1912), but the cases in the text are the
clearest of them all.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

116

A second exception to the rule is to be found in cases in
which the fraud is practiced not upon the defendant but upon
the court. There are a number of dicta declaring this exception, 42 but there seems to be only one case in which the point
was decided.
In Cook v. Ton of Morris,43 A was appointed conservator
of B and kept him out of his, B's estate. A settled his accounts in the probate court showing B indebted to him, and
then brought suit against the two for the support of B as an
alleged pauper. The town was permitted, to show that the decree
of the probate court had been obtained by fraud on the court.
The case, however, is weakened by . loose remark by. Chief
Justice Andrews that "a probate record may always be impeached
for fraud.""

A third exception is to be found in cases where the judge
has been corrupted. It was said in Locket v. Gross: 4
"It is true that if it can be shown that the judge, in granting
1
the injunction, was influenced by corrupt motives that fact will
avoid the bar which the judgment would otherwise afford, provided the corruption was induced either directly or indirectly by
the party in whose favor the injunction was granted, for no matter
how prejudiced or biased a judge may have been against the losing
party or his counsel, the prevailing party could not be held responsible or liable therefor if he did nothing toward producing the
prejudice or bias by which the judge was affected.".
In Burkhart v. Stephens 40 it was held that it makes no difference who corrupted the judge if he'was corrupt, whereas, in
Kirby v. Kirby 47 it w as said that if the judge was corrupt the
judgment cannot be attacked.
These exceptions are founded upon principle, but there are
'*Bowman v. Wilson, 64 Ill. App. 73 (x895); Kirby v. Kirby, 142 Ind.
41,9 (895); Mandeville v. Reynolds, 68 N. Y. s28 (1877), where it was
said: "Judgment obtained by fraud upon the court binds not such court or
any other, and its nullity upon that ground, though it has not been set aside
or reversed, may be alleged in a collateral proceeding."
066 Conn. 137 (1895).
" See Eysaman v. Nelson, 79 Misc. 304 (N. Y. 1913).
Ga. App. 772 (1910).
117 Mo. App. 425 (19o).
0 142 Ind. 4'9 (1895).
a8
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two cases that recognize the general rule but base exceptions to

it upon the character of the judgment attacked, a matter which
seems arbitrary.
In Johnson v. Girwood 48 it was held that a judgment of
"Guilty" obtained by confession in a criminal court may beattacked by the defendant on the ground of fraud.
In United States v. ClIng Stwe 49 it was said that a decree
remanding a prisoner to custody, upon a writ of labeas corpus,
is not the subject of the rule of res adjudicata.
But it has already been noticed that the decisions in cases
involving only facts covered by the general rule are not uniform. Black in his Treatise on Judgments 50 limits the showing of fraud by parties and privies to Pennsylvania, South
Carolina and New Hampshire. To this we must add Kentucky,
and further state that there are cases in North Carolina, Indiana,
Iowa, Texas and England which seem to be irreconcilable with
the overwhelming weight of authority in those jurisdictions;
The Pennsylvania. cases are the most numerous and the
most interesting. It is doubtful to which side Pennsylvania belongs. *The earliest case seems to be Hali v. Hanlin"I in which
A brought ejectment against B, who held title by virtue of a
sheriff's sale. The plaintiff offered to show that the judgment
upon which the sale was made was void because obtained by
fraud. The lower court ruled out the evidence. Its judgment
was reversed. This is very. clearly a case of permitting a collateral attack. It cannot be said to fall within any of the exceptions noted.
In Mitchell v. Knit:er-2 the defendant's husband took title
to certain of her lands, in: the partition of an estate in which she
was entitled to a purpart, without any consideration. He then
fraudulently confessed judgment, and upon execution the lands
were sold to the plaintiff, who brought ejectment. An offer to
prove these facts was refused. Judgment was reversed.
"7 Misc. 65x (N. Y. 1894), affirmed 143 N. Y. 66o
"7x Fed. 277 (i89S).
Section 29o. See notes 334 and 335.
'2 WVatts 354 (Pa. 1834).
"S Pa. 216 (847).
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In Jackson v. Sitrinerville,53 however, a contrary tendency
appears. A obtained a deed of an undivided interest from B
by fraud, secured judgment in partition and received his purpart. Then B. died and his widow and children brought ejectment. Coulter, J., said: "The principle that judgments and
decrees of courts procured by actual fraud are null to the extent of the fraud, as against the party defrauded is as old as the
time of Lord Coke and is familiar in our own jurisprudence,"
but he omitted to state that the case *fromthe Reports to which
he refers was one in which an entire stranger to the record
had sought to have the judgment declared void as to him.
Justice Coulter took great pains to say -that no judgment has
declared the deed from Summerville to Jackson was not obtained
by fraud.
In Hagenawn v. Salisberry 4 the court in a very brief opinion reverses the rule thus three times declared, without referring to the previous cases. A gave B a bond which B ent:ared
up, and sold land under the judgment to C, who conveyed to the
defendant. A's heirs at law, after his death, brotght ejectment
and sought to show that the signature to the bond was a forgery.
Mr. Justice Mercur said:
"If a jtidgment be confessed by an attorney, neither his authority nor the regularity of the judgment can be inquired into in
a collateral action. Where he appears- without authority and confesses judgment, the remedy is against -him, or, in a proper case,
the court in which it was entered may open the judgment."
This ruling was confirmed in Otterson v. Middleton.55 A
bequeathed to B, who assigned his legacy to C, but D attached
it in the hands of the executors. The Orphans' Court decided
in favor of C, but D- proceeded with his attachment in the
Common Pleas. The garnishee offered the Orphans' Court
record in evidence and the plaintiff offered to show that the
decree was obtained by fraud. Green, J., said:
13 Pa. 359 (185o).
"74 Pa. 28o (1873).

"1o2 Pa. 78 088).
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"We have, then, the case of a decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction in a proper proceeding, after hearing, argument and
decision upon the same issue, now raised, and between the same
parties now contending and we are clearly of opinion it is conclusive upon those parties until reversed on appeal or opened and
set aside by the court which made it, upon application, for that
purpose."
In Ogle v. taker " the new rule was still further fortified.
That case was an action of trespass for that the defendant, by
fraud, obtained a judgment against the plaintiff and collected
it by attachment execution. I\'cCullom, J., said:
"The general rule is that money collected or paid upon execution cannot be recovered back unless the judgment on which the
writ issued is first vacated or reversed. . .
If it be conceded that the averments of the appellee are true, her appropriate
remedy was an application to open the judgment."
The next case, however, is the other way.

In Phelps v.

Benson.." A and B agreed that A would bid in a property
exposed to Orphans' Court sale and that if he bid it in and B
did not bid, A would pay B's judgment lien on the property.
The case is badly reported. Practically the entire opinion,
which is per cur., is as follows: "As a general rule, the records
and decrees of the Orphans' Court cannot be impeached in a
collateral proceeding. An exception to the general rule is when
it is alleged that the decree was obtained by fraud."
McClain's Appeal,58 however, goes back to the general rule.
In that case the claimant sued the executor of an estate in the
Common Pleas on an obligation of the decedent, and recovered
a judgment. On the audit of the executor's account in the
Orphans' Court, the claimant rested on his judgment, which the
executors sought to show had been obtained by fraud. This
the court refused to allow.
Gaczam v. Reading5 9 is not a case of collateral attack, be.
cause it was a direct application to avoid the judgment, made in
"137 Pa. 378

(1890).

161 Pa. 418 (1894).
U20o Pa. 231 089,-).
"2o2Pa. 231 (1902).
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the very case in which the judgmeent was rendered. It is
the very case in which the judgment was rendered. It is treated
by the court, however, as a collateral attack and denied. The
matter is unworthily handled.
While the decision of West Homestead Borough v.
Erbeck o does not rest upon the point we are considering, it is
there said obiter, "The gist of this complaint is this fraud, and
in the face of such a charge, if made and sustained, even in a.
collateral proceeding, neither record, award, judgment or decree
will furnish shelter to the wrongdoer."
In this state of the cases it is almost impossible to prognosticate what rule the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will adhere
to when next the question of collateral attack upon a judgment,
on the ground of fraud, comes before it. We can find no theory
or distinction by which to reconcile the cases, unless we make each
case authority for its own facts by drawing absolutely arbitrary
distinctions. 61
Of the Kentucky cases Ellis v. Kelley 62 is, the broadest.
A, by fraud, obtained judgment against B and collected. Then
B discovered the fraud and sued A. He was allowed to recover the money. 3
The cases in South Carolina follow those in Kentucky. 04
and so does State v. Little, the New Hampshire case on this
point.6
Pa. 316 (gx).
"In the midst of such a plethora of Supreme Court precedent, tlev
county court case of Bank v. Kern, 8 Pa. Dist.75 (899), following the general rule, needs only to be mentioned.
U8 Bush 621 (Ky. x87i).
'See also Fars v. Durham, 5 T. B. Mon. 397 (Ky. 1827); Thcmas v.
Ireland, 88 Ky. s8i (.x889); First- National Bank v. Cunningham, 48 Fed.
51o (i8gi), by the United States Court applying the Kentucky law, and Ft.
Jefferson Improvement Co. v. Greene, 65 S. W. 161 (Ky. Ct. of Appeals
";230

19o1).

oCrawford v. Crawford a De Saussre, a,6 (S. C. i81x); Sullivan v.
Ball, 5s S. C. 345 (1899). But see, Norton v. Wallace, 2 Rich. L. 460 (S. C.
1845)..
"i N. H. 257 (188). to the same effect as Great Falls v. Worcester, 45
N. H. 11o (186.3). but Blanchard v. Webster. 62 N. H. 467 (88.3). isflatly
to the effect that the probate decree attacked was binding on all the worl.
It is true the decree was forty years old.
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It would seem from an examination of these cases that the
general rule as we have laid it down is not applicable in the
States of Kentucky, South Carolina and New Hampshire, but
that a judgment may be collaterally impeached for fraud in those
jurisdictions.
There are sporadic cases in other states inconsistent with
the general rule. We will examine these cases with greatest
care to ascertain if they can be distinguished.
Houser v. Bonsall 66 arose because the plaintiff's father had
brought a suit as next friend of his minor son, recovered a judgment for the very injuries the plaintiff sued for, and collected.
The Superior Court threw out the plaintiff's suit because of the
prior judgment, refusing to hear it attacked on the ground of
fraud. This was reversed. While the court said that an independent action under the code to vacate the judgment was the
only proper remedy, the parties all being before the court, the
attack was treated as a bill in equity to set the judgment aside.
This appears to be quite possible tinder North Carolina practice'
and the case cannot, therefore, be said to be really inconsistent
with the other North Carolina precedents. 7
Pfiffncr v. Krapfel Il presents an unusual feature. A obtained judgment against B by inducing her to accept service
of the writ, fraudulently concealing the purport of her act.
Then he obtained judgment and sold B's land to C. The land
was then sold for taxes, and B redeemed it and brought ejectment against C, who was in possession. The court rendered
judgment for B, but does not seem to have been cognizant
of the fact that thereby they permitted a judgment to be'impeached in a collateral proceeding. Very little reliance could be
r49 N. C. 52 (19o).
r "It is settled by a long and uniform line of decisions of this.court that
a final judgment can be attacked for fraud in its procurement only by an
independent action (for that purpose only), Fowler v. Poor, 93 N. C. 466;
Syme v. Trice, 96 N. C. 243; Buckhouse v. Sutton, 99 N. C. io3 , Smith v.
Fort, ioS N. C. 446." Lanier v. H-eiling, 14o*N. C.'384 (igo8). Earp v. Minton, 138 N. C. 202 (9o5); Carter v. Roundtree, iog N" C. 29 (1891), but

see Glover v. Flowers, io N. C. x34 (1888).
428 Iowa 27 (i86).
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placed on the weight of this decision as a precedent, in view of
9
the other Iowa cases.;
In Cottercll v. Koon °" the court disposed of the question
of collateral attack by saying that fraud of itself is a direct
attack, a proposition we have already commented upon. 71 The
other Indiana cases do not follow this ruling.
In Hutchinson v. Lockett,' 2 the p!aintiff first brought a suit
for specific performance and paid $i5o, the purchase money,
into court. Then he withdrew the purchase money, which
avoided his suit. He then entered judgment by default against
the defendant. Subsequently, he brought an action of trespass
to try the title, and offered his fraudulent judgment in evidence.
The court said: 'That a judgment rendered in a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be attacked in a collateral proceeding
is a rule of almost universal application. Nevertheless, a judgment may be impeached in any proceeding upon the ground of
fraud or satisfaction. It is said this rule may be applied to judgments affected by fraud, whether the fraud arises before,°at the
time of or after the rendition of the judgment. The court has
only to determine that a judgment is founded in fraud to authorize its impeachment as a nullity," all of which was perfectly gratuitous, for the case is clearly within the second exception to the general rule as above stated. The fraud was'a
fraud upon the court, which never would have permitted a judgment by default to have been entered had it been made to appear that the purchase money had been withdrawn. The wording quoted is therefore mere dictum.' s
' See Telford v. Barney, x Greene 575 (Iowa I848) ; Mason v. Messinger,
Smith v. Smith, 22 Iowa S16 (1897); Edmundson v.
Jackson School District, 98 Iowa 639 (896); Mahoney v. Insurance Company, 133 Iowa 57o (19O7); Gilman v. Heitman, 137 Iowa 336 (i9o8); Lang
17 Iowa 261 (864);

v. Dunn, 145 Iowa 363 (1910).

But see Corwin v. Toole, 31 Iowa 513 (i871);

Whetstone v. Whetstone, 31 Iowa 276 (1871), and Warthen v. Heimstreet,

112 Iowa 6o5 (19oo).
"151 Ind. 182 (1898).
' Supra, note 3. Accord, Kirby v. Kirby, 142 Ind. 419
Cline v. Murrell, 9 Ind. 516 (-857): Weiss v. Gourneau, iog
Mannix v. State, i 15 Ind. 245 (188) ; Schultz v. Schultz, 136
Oster v. Broe, 16I Ind. 113 (19o3); Young v. Wiley, io7
1914).

"239 Tex. 165 (1873).
'And see latch v. de la Garza,

22

(1895); but see
Ind. 438 (1886) ;
Ind. 323 (1893);
N. E. 278 (Ind.

Tex. 176 (1858); Storer v. Lane,
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The English case of Cole v. Langford7 4 however, presents
much greater difficulties. The fraud there presented was nothing
but perjury in the evidence offered at the previous trial, yet the
Queen's Bench Division was so clear that the judgment should
be set aside that they rendered no opinion.
The Canadian case of Rodgers v. Porter -3seems to be a
direct reflection of the decision in the mother country. The
facts of the case present the familiar attempt by the defendant,
after having suffered the collection of a fraudulent judgment,
suing to recover the money so collected. The court breezily remarks that such a rank injustice as that presented to it-by the
evidence could not be tolerated and permits the recovery. No
precedents are relied upon.
Either Moses v. Macferlan 6 or Cole v. Langford" is
wrong. Both cannot be the law. To the commentator there
can be but one choice when the pregnant words of Lord Mansfield are weighed against the decision (without opinion) of the
Queen's Bench Division of 1898. To the counsellor the two
cases spell caution, and to the advocate, confusion. 77 4
Foreign Judgmens.
So far we have considered only cases dealing -with domestic
judgments. It seems, on principle, that the case of a judgment
of one of the United States should receive treatment in the
x Tex. Civ. App.

260 (t892) ; Grant v. Hill, 3o S. W. 952 (Tex. 1894); Irwin
v. Bexar County, 63 S. W. 55o (Tex. igox); White v. Bedell, x73 S. W. 624
(Tex. 1915).
t
'L R. 2 Q. B. (898) 3.
"37 New Brunswick'235 (igos).

"Supra.

Supra.
1 The case of Wyatt v. Palmer L. R. 2 Q. B. (1899). io6. follows Cole v.
Langford. The question is rendered more or less immaterial because of the
presence of another element in the case, but the remarks of Lindley, M. R.,
are worthy of comment. He says (p. iog): "Thereupon the plaintiff brings
an action to impeach that judgment on the ground that it was obtained by
fraud. It is said that no such action will lie. That proposition is so new
to me that, as an equity lawyer, I was startled by it. That an action could
not be brought to impeach a decree or judgment on the ground of fraud
was a surprise to me."
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courts of a sister state analogous to that accorded a domestic
judgment. Foreign judgments might be more frequently open
to attack upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction; but that is a
question beyond the scope of the article. The cases, however,
make a slight distinction in treating foreign judgments. The
point is worthy of brief notice, and there are but six cases.
They are by no means reconcilable. Five are to the effect
that fraud cannot be shown, while one is the other way.
In Benton v. Burgot 78 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
decided that the judgment of another state's courts cannot be
attacked by fraud.
In Anderson v. Anderson 71 the conclusion was reached that
a foreign judgment could be attacked only by a proceeding in
equity.
In Field v. Sanderson80 the general rule was applied without much consideration. The cause of complaint was perjury.
In McRae v. Mattoon "I the court could find no distinction
from Homer v. Fish,8 2 where the judgment attacked was domestic.
In Dunlap v. Byers,"8 after an elaborate and lucid discusSion, it was resolved that a decree in the equity court of one
state is binding on the consciences of the parties even in another
state's courts and cannot be attacked on the ground of fraud.
The case on the other side is much more elaborately considered. In Murray v. Murray s4 the question was the legal
effect in Oregon of a decree of divorce rendered in Indiana. It
was said:
"If a party seeks a benefit under a judgment or decree of a
superior court of a sister state, in an action where such judgment
cannot be pleaded, as in this case, being an action to recover real
property under our statute, he may offer it in evidence and inas"xo S. & R. 24o (Pa. 1823), and see also Bank v. Fries-Breslin Co., 214
Pa. 395 (19o6).
"8 Ohio o8 (837).
'*34 Mo. 42 (1864).
a r3 Pick. 53 Mass. (1832).
"1 Pick. 435 (Mass. 1823).
Uno Mich. iog 086).

"6 Oregon 17 (1876).
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much as his adversary has had no opportunity to attack it in our
own court by a direct proceeding and should not be required to
go into a foreign state to attack it and impeach it by evidence of
want of notice to the party and by evidence of fraud in procuring
it; notwithstanding such decree or judgment may, by its recitals
appear regular and show jurisdiction." 85
The case affords on close study a most excellent example
of the misapplication of the doctrine of public convenience.
From all the precedents we may conclude that except in
the jurisdictions already pointed out whether the judgment in
question be domestic or foreign, it is conclusive as to all matters
determined by it if the court had jurisdiction of the persons and
the res, and the record is regular on its face; at least so far as
parties and privies are concerned. Only in cases where fraud is
alleged to exist in a matter not litigated, or was perpetrated on
the court or by the court, is there room for a collateral attack.
ATTACK BY THIRD PARTIES.

Having thus concluded our examination of the cases dealing with parties and privies, we have now to turn to the second
portion of our inquiry, attack by third parties.
We will find the rules here comparatively simple and almost
universally accepted. For the sake of precision only it may be
well to divide third parties into two classes: creditors and
others.
A judgment given by collusion between the debtor and the
plaintiff in such judgment for the purpose of hindering and
delaying creditors may be collaterally attacked by the creditors
intended to be defrauded."" But the fraud which will justify
'Quacre how far this contravenes the "full faith and credit" cause of

the Federal Constitution? See Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 29 (U. S.
1866).
T
Lowber's Estate, 8 W. & S. 387 (Pa. 1845); obiter, Woodward v.
Schmidt. , Phila. I5-: Brown v. Ahl. 29 Pa. .57 (1857): Spicer v. Vaters.
6z' Barb. 227 (N. Y. i866); Thompson's Appeal, 57 Pa. 175 (1869); Clark
v. Douglas, 62 Pa. 408 (1869); Smith v. Henderson, 23 La. Ann. 649
(i871); Second National Bank of Titusville's Appeal, 85 Pa. 528 (1877);
Shallcross v. Deats, 43 N. J. Law 177 (iS8i); Meckey's Appeal, io2 Pa. 536

(883); Richardson v. Trimble. 38 Hun 409 (N. Y. 1886); Stark's Appeal,
128 Pa. 545 (1889); Northern Pacife v. Boyd, 17 Fed. 8o4 (i9io); Bole v.
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such an attack must be fraud designed to injure the attacking
creditors or at least such as directly affects their interests. Fraud
practiced upon the debtor only is not sufficient."- But such an
attack does not impair the obligation of the judgment between
the original parties upon whom it is binding. A fraudulent
judgment like a fraudulent deed, is good as against all but the
interests intended to be defrauded thereby.
Substantially the same rule applies to collateral attack by
other third parties. A stranger to the record may always impeach a judgment which stands in his way by plea and proof
of fraud in obtaining it, for it is his only means of availing
himself of the fraud."' But, like a creditor, he must show rights
and claims which would be prejudiced by the enforceiient of
the judgment 11 and which accrued prior to its rendition." Thus,
where a purchaser'at sheriff's sale of a property which was subject to a judgment which had been recovered by means of fraud,
sought to attack the judgment, it was held that as his rights
Belden, 239 Pa. i (19T2); Wenatchee v. Stafford Orchard Company, 205 Fed.
964 (1913); Blau v. Bernagozzie, 54 Pa. Superior Court zxt (1913). But in
Parker v. Waugh, 34 Mlo. 340 (1864), where A levied an execution but left
the goods seized in the possession of the execution defendant, it was held
that the transaction was presumptively fraudulent as against a subsequent
execution creditor.

"Dougherty's Appeal, 9 W. & S. 189 (j845); Drexel's Appeal, 6 Pa.
272 (1847); Lewis v. Rodgers, 16 Pa. i8 (1851); Hackett v. Manlove, 14 Cal.
85 (i8q); De Armond v. Adams, 2s Ind. 455 (86.) ; Miners Trust Company v. Roseberry, 81 Pa. 309 (1876); Sheetz v. Hanbest, 8S Pa. oo (z876)
McAlpine v. Sweester, 76 Ind. 78 (188i0; Hanika's Estate, 138 Pa. 330
(i&go); Zug v. Searight, 15o Pa. So6 (i892); Safe Deposit Company v.
Wright, io5 Fed. 255 (goo).
"Dutchess v. Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Trials 355 (Eng. ;776);
Crosby v. Lang, 12 East 409 (Eng. i8io); Atkinson v. Allen, 12 Vt. 61g
(i83.9): Downs v. Fuller. 2 Me. 13. (Mass. 1840); Williams v. Martin. 7
Ga. 37,7 (1849): Cline v. Murrell, 9 Ind. 516 (1857); obiter, Great Falls v.
Worcester, 45 N. H.

To

(1863) ; obiter. Sidenspacker v. Sidenspacker, 52 Me.

481 (1864): Smith v. Cutler. 78 Ga. 654 (887); Bradley v. Reynolds, 61
Conn. 271 (892-); Ogle v. Baker. 137 Pa. 378 (i89o); Cook v. Town of
Morris, 66 Conn. 137 (i805); Morris v. Sadler, 74 Kan. 892 (i9o6).
But see Grant v. Hill, 2o S. W. 952 (Tex. i894), and Childs v. Ham, 23 Me.
74 (1843).
, Meeker v. WMilliamson, 8 Martin 365 (La. i8--o) ; Miners Bank v. Roseberry, 81 Pa. 309 (876).
"Lewis v. Peterkin, 39 La. Ann. 780 (1887); Morris v. Sadler, 74 Kan.
892(i9o6).
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would not be prejudiced by the enforcement of the judgment
he could not attack the judgment.9 1
These rules are very simple in comparison with those applying to parties and privies. The question who is a privy has
been much disputed,92- but that is a question not within the
scope of this inquiry.
Plziladclphia.

Graham C. lVoodward.

Miners Bank v. Roseberry, S Pa. 309 (1876). But note the distinction
in Hogg v. Link, go Ind. 346 (1883), where the plaintiff had paid for the
property as if there had been no judgment and was allowed to attack.
"See, for example, Bridgeport Insurance Company v. Wilson, 34 N. Y.
275 (1866); Tuthill v. Smith, go Iowa 331 (1894).

